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IFrances M. Kamm

Frances M. Kamm
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8349.00061 21-39 First published online: 1 July 2000


In this article I am concerned with whether it could be morally significant to distinguish between doing something ‘in order to bring about an effect’ as opposed to ‘doing something because we will bring about an effect’. For example, the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) tells us that we should not act in order to bring about evil, but even if this is true is it perhaps permissible to act only because an evil will thus occur? I discuss these questions in connection with a version of the so-called Trolley Problem known as the Loop Case. I also consider how these questions may bear on whether a rational agent must aim at an event which he believes is causally necessary to achieve an end he pursues.

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