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II—Christopher Shields: The Peculiar Motion of Aristotelian Souls

Christopher Shields
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2007.00154.x 139-161 First published online: 1 June 2007


Aristotle has qualms about the movement of the soul. He contends directly, indeed, that ‘it is impossible that motion should belong to the soul’ (DA 406a2). This is surprising in both large and small ways. Still, when we appreciate the explanatory framework set by his hylomorphic analysis of change, we can see why Aristotle should think of the soul's motion as involving a kind of category mistake-not the putative Rylean mistake, but rather the mistake of treating a change as itself capable of changing.

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