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II—Jonathan L. Kvanvig: Millar on the Value of Knowledge

Jonathan L. Kvanvig
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00197.x 83-99 First published online: 1 June 2011

Abstract

Alan Millar's paper (2011) involves two parts, which I address in order, first taking up the issues concerning the goal of inquiry, and then the issues surrounding the appeal to reflective knowledge. I argue that the upshot of the considerations Millar raises count in favour of a more important role in value-driven epistemology for the notion of understanding and for the notion of epistemic justification, rather than for the notions of knowledge and reflective knowledge.

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