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II—Objectivity and Idolatry

Yonatan Shemmer
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akw010 191-216 First published online: 1 July 2016


The attempt to vindicate the objectivity of morality tops the list of philosophical obsessions. In this paper I consider the rationality of searching for such a vindication. I argue that the only justification of our efforts lies in our belief in moral objectivity; that this belief can be as well, if not better, explained by wishful thinking and other cognitive biases; that as a research community we have failed to take precautions against such biases; and that as a result we have been making disproportionate, and therefore irrational, efforts to establish moral objectivity.

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